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Compared to the topic of radicalization, deradicalization was long treated as secondary in research, at least until
recently. This article outlines the most important findings from theory and practice in three steps by: (1) discuss -
ing and reviewing existing classifications and typologies, (2) suggesting a conceptualization of the term “deradi-
calization” while considering discourses about the roles of ideology, identity and risk, and, based on this, (3)
providing an overview of the empirical case of practical work in Germany. It turns out that central actors from
practice, academia, (security) authorities and politics not only use different definitions, but there is also little
agreement on what deradicalization (practically) means. The German case shows that the landscape of deradi-
calization, differentiated into four fields of action, is highly diverse. However, the existing hybrid model of state
and civic competences as well as the variety of approaches and actors should – with proper accentuation – be
seen as an opportunity.
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While  the  idea  of  deradicalization  was  given  little
thought during past periods marked by extremist vio-
lence,  approaches and projects that advance deradi-
calization (and see an imperative to engage in deradi-
calization efforts) have become widely accepted prac-
tice today. The sheer number of crimes and increasing
“quality” of acts of violence motivated by extremism
on the far right, and other disquieting statistics, such
as the about 350 fighters who have returned to Ger-
many alone  from war-torn  areas  in  Syria  and Iraq,
have  also  contributed  to  rising  public  awareness  of
the need for deradicalization (Bundesministerium des
Innern,  für  Bau  und  Heimat  2018,  189).  Therefore,
even in light of widespread politicization (political ex-
ploitation) of this topic,  the reality of “homegrown”
extremism of various orientations is forcing Germany
and Europe to look beyond securitization and towards
more sustainable modes of long-term prevention and
deradicalization.
Similarly, compared to the rather marginal academic
consideration of  the issue of  deradicalization in the
past, growing interest in this area has led to a notable
increase  in  theory-focused  publications  in  recent
years (Horgan et al. 2017, 63; For an overview of the
literature see Köhler and Fiebig 2019; Grip and Kota-
joki 2019; Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier 2019).
The majority of these studies rely on qualitative inter-
views  with  relevant  professionals  from the fields  of
preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)
and, in some cases, with those at risk of radicalization
as their primary sources. Quantitative studies have so
far tended to be the exception in this area.
Recently, and mostly because of its complexity, sev-
eral authors have concentrated on descriptive studies
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of the German landscape of practical work, without
addressing the work fields themselves in further de-
tail.  Overviews of  this  kind are provided by  Köhler
(2017), as well as by various publications by the Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) (for example Abay
Gaspar et al. 2020;  Pisoiu et al. 2020; Meiering, Dziri,
and Foroutan 2020; Herschinger et al. 2020) or the Ter-
rorism/Extremist Research Unit (FTE) of the German
Federal  Criminal  Police  Office  (Eilers,  Gruber,  and
Kemmesies 2015; El-Mafaalani et al. 2016; Gruber and
Lützinger 2017a,  2017b).  In addition,  several authors
have  published  on  international  practical  develop-
ments  which need to be  watched closely  (Mattsson
and Johansson 2018; Chernov Hwang 2017; Windisch,
Scott Ligon, and Simi 2017).
In Germany, and northern Europe as a whole,  the
theoretical  conceptualizations  of  deradicalization  in
circulation today mostly draw on “classic” literature
dealing with far-right extremism (Möller 2000; Rom-
melspacher 2006; Wahl 2003;  Willems et al. 1993). In-
ternationally,  research  on  radicalization,  disengage-
ment, and deradicalization is often more varied, span-
ning  far-right  extremism,  historical  anarchism,  Is-
lamism and left-wing  extremism of  different  forms,
among others (Ribetti 2008; Boucek 2008; Alonso 2008;
Bjørgo and Horgan 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko
2011; Bjørgo 1997, 2011; Altier et al. 2014). Researchers
are  also  currently  focusing  on  so-called  right-wing
populism and its  polarizing effects on various Euro-
pean societies (Mudde 2016,  2017;  Mudde and Kalt-
wasser  2017;  Caiani  and  Cisar  2018;  Salzborn  2017;
Häusler and Virchow 2016)  as well as the use of the
internet by far-right extremists  (Müller and Schwarz
2018). 
Other contributions look into the specific thematic
fields  of  deradicalization  work  for  the  area  of  Is-
lamism, such as family and social environment coun-
seling (Gruber and Lützinger 2017a, 2017b; Hohnstein
et al.  2015;  Trautmann and Zick 2016),  deradicaliza-
tion  in  the  context  of  correctional  facilities  (Global
Center  on  Cooperative  Security  and  International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 2017; Ill-
gner et al. 2017; Ionescu et al. 2017; RAN Prison and
Probation  Working  Group  2016;  Silke  2011;  Traut-
mann and Zick 2016; Cherney 2018a; Cherney 2018b),
risk  assessment  and  reduction  (Dhami  and  Murray
2016;  Innes et al.  2017; Sarma 2017; Silke 2014; BMJ
Task Force “De-Radikalisierung im Strafvollzug” 2016),
ideology (Kruglanski et al.  2014; Mythen et al.  2017;
Olsen 2009; Rabasa et al. 2010; Selim 2016), and evalu-
ations (Dechesne 2011; Gielen 2015; Kober 2017; Köh-
ler  2017;  Schuurman  and  Bakker  2016; Cherney
2018b).  Overlap  also  exists  with  neighboring  fields,
such  as  research  on  cults  or  sects  and  work  with
gangs (Rabasa et al.  2010; RAN 2017b; Schmid 2013;
Selim 2016; Stern 2010). We see plenty of (hitherto un-
derutilized) opportunities here for researchers to learn
from one another (see also RAN 2017b).
Despite  the  growing  volume  of  literature  in  this
area,  several  problems  remain.  In  many  cases,  re-
search findings are only transferred into practice long
after the respective challenge should have been ad-
dressed “in the field”. Approaches that combine prac-
tical insights with theoretical conceptualizations con-
tinue to be neglected (Köhler and Fiebig 2019). Addi-
tionally,  there  seem  to  be  no  relevant  longitudinal
studies on the development of individuals who have
passed  through  deradicalization  or  exit  programs,
which would be capable of proposing definitive state-
ments as to the effectiveness of certain approaches. 
Based on these assessments, this article aims to ad-
dress these gaps while suggesting a conceptualization
of  deradicalization  taking  into  account  current  dis-
courses as well as areas of implementation and struc-
tures of deradicalization work in Germany. 
1 Method
A structured literature review was conducted: Based
on the authors’ expertise several university libraries as
well  as the web of science databases were searched
using relevant key words (in English and German, for
example deradicalisation, desistance, tertiary preven-
tion). Relevant references within the texts were also
added. Following this, a database with approximately
560 entries was set up for the team of writers and rel-
evant literature was then reviewed.
Additionally, interviews were conducted with twelve
experts from the field in order to ensure that this arti-
cle  provides  findings and recommendations  relevant
for practical P/CVE work (Prevention and Countering
of  Violent  Extremism).  Based  on  these  exploratory
and problem-centered  interviews  (Witzel  and Reiter
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2012) with German and European experts,  gaps and
challenges were defined. The experts were identified
through the extensive international  network of  Vio-
lence Prevention Network (VPN) and the EU’s Radi-
calisation Awareness Network (RAN). All of the inter-
viewees had to have multiple years of practical experi-
ence in their fields and be familiar with current aca-
demic  debates.  Interviews  were  then  conducted  in
German or English and transcribed, coded and ana-
lyzed using MAXQDA. The interviews were conducted
between October 2017 and April 2018. To ensure that
experts felt comfortable addressing both positive and
negative developments and aspects of their work and
to prevent conclusions regarding their affiliations be-
ing drawn, all interviews were anonymized. Based on
the findings of these interviews,  we defined criteria
for  practical  relevance  that  guided  the  rest  of  the
process:  literature review,  conceptualization,  and,  fi-
nally, analysis.
2 What is Deradicalization?
P/CVE  practice,  research,  policy-making  and  wider
debates  surrounding  the  topic  suffer  from a  deeply
counterproductive conflation of terms and definitions
(Abay Gaspar et al. 2020). Even though some progress
has been made in recent years, this still holds true for
research and especially for P/CVE practice, which, as
a result, very often lacks clear definitions of objectives
and conflates concepts.  As Ceylan and Kiefer (2017,
64) found, however, there is little purpose in seeking a
unified classification in the absence of a minimal con-
sensus in relation to the terms in use. Yet, without a
system of classification in place, hopes of developing
and testing effective quality standards,  which could
ultimately enhance comparability and professionaliza-
tion, will remain unattainable. This is why the follow-
ing chapter, as a first step, provides an overview of ex-
isting classifications and typologies.
2.1 Classifications and Typologies: Delineating 
Prevention and Deradicalization
Even if there appears to be a broad diversity of ap-
proaches  for  determining  classifications,  typologies
and termini, classification models originally borrowed
from the area of health and medicine have become
predominant in the fields of violence, extremism, and
radicalization prevention, especially in Germany (Cey-
lan and Kiefer 2017, 64–65).
Despite occasional opposition to this understanding
of prevention (Köhler 2017, 114), the leading models in
the ongoing debate are 1)  the differentiation of pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary prevention in line with
Caplan (1964) and 2) universal, selective and indicated
prevention  in  line  with  Gordon  (1983;  Ceylan  and
Kiefer 2017, 65; El-Mafaalani et al. 2016, 4). These two
models are often combined by way of the creation of
hybrid  forms  and  are  sometimes  even  used  inter-
changeably. One approach attempting to systematize
the  German  prevention  landscape  based on  such a
three-tier  understanding is  the framework proposed
by Trautmann and Zick. For the area of primary and
universal  prevention,  they  identify  the  fields  of  (1)
protection from harmful media, (2) school-based and
extracurricular educational work, and (3) institutional
network building (Trautmann and Zick 2016, 5–9). The
subsequent  work  of  target-group-specific  network
building  marks  the  transition  from primary  to  sec-
ondary  prevention.  Youth-work-oriented  support  is
categorized within secondary prevention, while holis-
tic counseling work forms part of either tertiary pre-
vention or, depending on the conceptual understand-
ing, intervention and/or deradicalization work (Traut-
mann and Zick 2016, 9–13).
A  brief  look  at  the  services  described  within  the
framework  of  primary  prevention  uncovers  a  very
broad understanding of prevention by Trautmann and
Zick.  It  includes  projects  such  as  the  Young  Islam
Conference  in  Germany,  an  initiative  that  does  not
specifically aim to prevent Islamist radicalization, but
rather seeks to promote the participation of younger
and more diverse voices in German pluralist society
and political decision-making (Junge Islam Konferenz,
n.d.).
An even broader definition of what comprises pre-
vention in the context of P/CVE was introduced by
Hedayah’s Cristina Mattei (2019).  Under the banner
of “General Prevention”, she includes measures aim-
ing to reduce push and pull factors as macro as unem-
ployment, which are not necessarily designed for P/
CVE purposes, but may entail positive results for P/
CVE nonetheless (Mattei 2019, 3–4). Thus, both Mattei
as well as Trautmann and Zick seem to conceptualize
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their classifications in a results- or outcome-oriented
manner, rather than a focus on the stated objectives.
In contrast, Ceylan and Kiefer (drawing from Lüders
and Holthusen 2008, 3) believe that measures and ser-
vices  should only  be  classified  as  forms  of  primary
prevention if they actually directly or indirectly aim to
hinder radicalization (Ceylan and Kiefer 2017, 62–63).
Their  understanding of  primary prevention is  there-
fore based on the intended objectives but not specific
to a certain target group (Ceylan and Kiefer 2017, 66–
67).
Starting at the level of secondary and selective pre-
vention, Ceylan and Kiefer’s typology becomes more
ambiguous  in  terms  of  the  conceptual  bounds  be-
tween the higher levels of prevention: deradicalization
and intervention. They argue that the threshold to de-
radicalization work is only crossed within the level of
tertiary  or  indicated  prevention.  The  differentiation
between secondary and tertiary prevention is met by
way  of  two theoretical  levels  of  radicalization  they
propose: Secondary prevention measures are for indi-
viduals exhibiting a high probability of (further) radi-
calization (which has not yet become manifest)  and
tertiary prevention measures target persons who are
already exhibiting manifest signs of radicalization and
who may have already committed crimes (Ceylan and
Kiefer 2017, 68, 72).
Therefore, depending on the individual’s respective
issues, measures on the third prevention level aim to
either demobilize and prevent crimes (for persons who
have not yet become criminal), facilitate an exit and
comprehensive socio-spatial reorientation (for persons
active in milieus with affinities for violence, but who
are willing to leave),  or  to prevent  new crimes and
promote social and vocational reintegration (for per-
sons  already  engaged  in  crime)  (Ceylan  and  Kiefer
2017, 72–73).
While this concept does not require an individual to
actively engage in crime or violence in order to qualify
for deradicalization, others take a different stance. For
example, Stern (2010, 1) and Mattei (2019, 7) both un-
derstand deradicalization measures as aimed only at
persons or groups who have already committed or ac-
tively supported crimes and/or violence related to ex-
tremism or terrorism. Such differences in understand-
ing deradicalization are likely to arise when the con-
cepts  of  what  defines  radicalization  and  extremism
are unclear (for  example engagement in violence or
activism vs. internal beliefs and worldviews).
Notwithstanding this, some authors cast doubt on
the feasibility of deradicalization (understood as “au-
thentic” abandonment of extremist views and related
behavior)  and,  instead,  propose  “demobilization”  or
“disengagement” as more realistic alternatives (Cey-
lan and Kiefer 2017, 73; Silke 2011, 18–20).
The  terms  “disengagement”  and  “demobilization”
are mostly used in the context of changes in behavior,
without the individuals in question having necessarily
renounced extremist views – a process that can also
be described  as  “behavioral  distancing”  (Bjørgo and
Horgan  2008;  Dechesne  2011;  Horgan  2009;  Horgan
and  Braddock  2010,  280;  Altier  et  al.  2014;  Feddes
2015, 2). It is also important to realize that people who
have cognitively and/or emotionally distanced them-
selves from extremist ideologies may continue to par-
ticipate in extremist groups and engage in related ac-
tivities (Köhler 2017, 3; Horgan and Altier 2012, 88). A
complex interplay of push and pull factors can explain
such seemingly  paradoxical  behaviors.  One example
of this would be processes within which personal and
emotional ties to other group members outweigh ei-
ther the  disadvantages of staying  in or the advantages
of leaving the group – or both. In this case, remaining
active in the group may be deemed more “rational” by
the individual than leaving (“in-group love”; Sageman
2004, 135). Such group dynamics significantly under-
mine the ability of deradicalization programs to focus
purely on the behavioral aspects of disengagement or
demobilization work – at least if sustainable societal
integration is the desired outcome.
Depending  on  the  understanding  and  definition
used, there seem to be two main ways to view disen-
gagement or behavioral distancing, also in relation to
deradicalization and in the context of P/CVE: (1)  as
part of a comprehensive program of deradicalization,
in  which  disengagement  constitutes  one  step  in  a
process  towards  the  ideal  behavioral  and cognitive
distancing (deradicalization); or (2) as an independent
program objective that aims to prevent (violent) be-
havior related to extremist views, without necessarily
engaging with the ideology.
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3 Conceptualizing Deradicalization?
The previous section illustrated that there seems to be
a  certain  degree  of  consensus  regarding  terms  and
concepts  related  to  the  prevention  of  extremism.
Nonetheless,  a  lack  of  clear  differentiation  persists,
partially due to conflicting notions of the concepts of
extremism and/or radicalization. Still, without a com-
mon understanding of  what “radical”  or  “extremist”
mean, the term “deradicalization” cannot be defined
adequately, nor the individual factors that comprise it.
As the basis for this article, and with relevance for the
context of European societies, we understand extrem-
ist radicalization as follows:
Radicalization pertains  to the cognitive  process  in
which an individual gradually appropriates extremist
views. The appropriation of individual elements of ex-
tremist ideologies is sufficient to label an individual as
“radical”. As such, in the context of the EU, radical or
radicalized individuals are those who expressly reject
and/or seek to eliminate (including, but not necessar-
ily by violent means) the liberal democratic order, its
underlying values and norms, and the associated plu-
ralistic model of society. A completely closed-off ex-
tremist worldview is not necessarily required in order
to classify an individual as “radical.”1
Consequently,  we can view “deradicalization” as  a
process through which a radicalized individual gradu-
ally  (re)processes  and  eventually  discards  their  ex-
tremist  views,  resulting  in  a  “deradicalized”  person
who at least no longer rejects the model of a demo-
cratic society and is ultimately even proactively will-
ing, and most importantly, able to seek their own in-
clusion once again. Deradicalization in this sense in-
cludes demobilization or disengagement from activi-
ties related to extremist groups and/or beliefs. A per-
son  who  does  not  adhere  to  extremist  worldviews
(any longer), but continues to engage in activities in-
spired by extremist  views,  regardless  whether  these
views are indeed their own or merely those of a group
to which they still belong (see above), cannot be con-
sidered deradicalized. 
This process should  not, however, be regarded as a
mere inversion of  the original  process  of  radicaliza-
1 Deitelhoff  and Junk (2018) and Dziri (2018) serve as a good 
basis for future discussions about the understanding of the 
concepts of “radicalization” and “radical”. Also see Abay 
Gaspar et al. 2020.
tion, as the person would simply end up back at their
entry point to radicalization without having come to
terms  with  the  individual  problems  that  created  a
cognitive and emotional opening for, and inclination
towards, extremist views in the first place. Such a re-
versal would also fail to account for the personal de-
velopment individuals might experience in the course
of their radicalization and/or membership of extremist
groups.
Once a person has finally accounted for and come to
terms with all or at least the majority of factors that
made them susceptible to radicalization they can be
considered deradicalized for the respective social con-
text, and on a provisional basis. This must, however,
be followed up by long-term support aimed at main-
taining their inclusion in many aspects of social, cul-
tural, economic, and spiritual life and society in order
to prevent any potential personal crises from leading
to recidivism.
Based on the literature review and the interviews
conducted by the authors, three topics emerged as re-
curring elements of contemporary discourses on the
practice  of  deradicalization and should therefore be
explored in more detail: ideology, identity, and risk.
3.1 On the Role of Ideologies
The role ideologies play in individual processes of rad-
icalization is contentious. When considering Islamist
radicalization, Gilles Kepel identifies causes for radi-
calization within dysfunctional social relations and in
the role  assumed by Islam. Olivier Roy, in contrast,
believes  that  individual  behavior  and  psychological
aspects (fantasies of violence) play a more significant
role  than  religion  or  ideology  (see  interview  state-
ments  from  Roy  and  Kepel  in  Nossiter  2016;  Putz
2016; Wittenbrink 2018). The ensuing debate between
these  two  points  of  view  reflects  the  question  of
whether  “Islam”  is  radicalizing  itself  or  if  an  “Is-
lamization of radicalism” has taken place.
In the scope of their research on far-right extrem-
ism,  Heitmeyer  et  al.  proposed the instrumentaliza-
tion hypothesis in 1993, which suggests that ideolo-
gies of inequality and violence mainly assume a func-
tional character and could be positioned within this
larger debate (Heitmeyer et al. 1993, 595–96). Ideolo-
gies of inequality and violence can be used to imple-
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ment  individual  strategies  for  coping  with  life  and
controlling reality in response to the need for self-as-
sertion (Heitmeyer et al. 1993, 595). In this sense, ide-
ologies can be better understood as a “means to an
end” rather than an original cause of radicalization –
a view that is similar to Olivier Roy’s.
When discussing “religiously motivated” extremism,
it is vital to distinguish between the terms “religion”
and “ideology”. In a recent study, Michael Kiefer et al.
(2018) assert that ideology, rather than religion, plays
the predominant role in radicalization of individuals.
In the course of a study focusing on a group of young
people with Islamist views, Dziri and Kiefer (2018, 56)
describe them as  religiously  illiterate  and only  pos-
sessing a rudimentary knowledge of Islam, if any at
all. The authors observe that the group utilizes an ide-
ology  that  they  refer  to  as  “Lego  Islam,”  through
which they occupy a number of Islamist extremist po-
litical positions irrespective of schools of thought or
consistency (Dziri and Kiefer 2018, 23).
Despite this observation, Kiefer asserts that ideolo-
gies are likely  to adopt various  roles.  He highlights
the  different  personalities  found  within  ideological
groups:  On the  one hand,  we find individuals  from
precarious living situations with a very low level of re-
ligious  or  ideological  knowledge while,  at  the  same
time, there are also many “cadres” who boast a flaw-
less  ideological  and  theological  education  (cited  in
Wittenbrink  2018;  RAN 2017a;  Baaken  and Schlegel
2017).
In our interviews with P/CVE-practitioners working
in the field of religiously motivated extremism, it be-
came clear that religion, as a topic (of conversation),
can offer a very good initial entry point, even though
most of the individuals they work with are not reli-
giously  well  versed  (EXP01,  EXP03,  EXP08,  EXP09,
EXP11).  In  practical  P/CVE work,  those  who are  at
risk of radicalizing are therefore often made to reflect
on and scrutinize religious matters and their own be-
liefs by practitioners who, in turn, are often highly ed-
ucated  in  religious  topics.  The  same applies  to  the
area of far-right extremism: Individuals at risk of radi-
calizing often merely repeat slogans and hold dichoto-
mous worldviews, yet they are mostly unable to offer
concrete  arguments  or  substantiate  their  positions
when  challenged  (EXP01,  EXP03,  EXP08,  EXP09,
EXP11).
3.2 On the Role of Identity 
Individuals  typically  foster  and  maintain  multiple
roles and identities  (for  example European, Muslim,
student, and husband). Some people at risk of radical-
izing  experience  problems  in  developing  and  main-
taining multiple identities, often due to difficult – and
sometimes  traumatic  –  experiences  in  their  youth
(Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018,  94).  This  applies  particularly
to  individuals  of  diverse  ancestry  who often fail  to
find acceptance in either society (country of [ances-
tors’] origin or country of settlement) and can there-
fore develop a sense of  “double non-belonging” (El-
Mafaalani  and  Toprak  2011,  18).  By  nature,  people
look for ways out of identity crises (cognitive opening
caused by crisis/crises) (Kruglanski et al.  2014;  Wik-
torowicz 2004).  They seek to assume a new identity
with fewer inherent tensions, for example one offered
by an extremist group and/or ideology, to which they
then completely reduce their worldview (Gøtzsche-As-
trup  2018,  94).  Radicalization  therefore  initiates  a
process of “identity reduction” through which individ-
uals abandon attempts to construct complex (multi-
ple)  identities  and  begin  to  reduce  their  sense  of
themselves  to  a  singular  “nationalist,”  “jihadist,”  or
similar brand of identity (Davis and Cragin 2009, 35;
Mücke 2016, 64–68).
Depending on the respective personality structure,
this  identity reduction may be amplified by various
mechanisms  of  ideology  and/or  group processes.  In
the  scope  of  the  typologies  proposed  by  Nesser
(2006a, 2006b, 2010) and Bjørgo (2011), we are repeat-
edly  brought  back  to  an  ideal-type  representation:
The identity of an ideological activist can, for exam-
ple, be strengthened or constructed through the ideol-
ogy, while followers often tend to compensate their
lacking sense of identity through the group. As such,
these various types satisfy their need for identity via
different  identification  characteristics.  In  reality,  a
spectrum of components is often at play (Neumann
2016).
This begs the question of where an individual can or
should be deradicalized to. In an ever-more complex
and,  at  the  same  time  polarizing  society,  the  aim
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should not be to persuade them to seek a supposedly
ideal position in the middle of the political spectrum,
but rather to foster subjects’ ability to tolerate ambi-
guities  within  themselves  as  well  as  within  society.
This  demands  individualized  conditions  that  help
them to cope with contradictory expectations regard-
ing identity and role. In order to effectively deradical-
ize under such conditions, it is imperative to focus on
strengthening social  safety nets as well  as elevating
those  aspects  of  an  individual’s  identity  that  have
been suppressed and marginalized as a result of the
exclusive focus on the identity central to the extremist
group and their ideology (Mücke 2016).
3.3 Risk and Risk Assessment Tools 
Looking at  the bulk of  models that aim to describe
and explain processes of radicalization, one can often
observe  an  underlying  ontological  assumption,  that
different and clearly ordered degrees of radicalization
exist and could be generalized (Borum 2011a; Borum
2011b). This kind of flawed understanding of the con-
tingency  and  complexity  of  individual  processes  of
radicalization  is  worthy  of  critique.  Radicalization
processes do not proceed linearly and hence should
not be perceived in degrees (Illgner et al. 2017, 89). At
the same time, the use of “risk assessment tools” that
often rely on degree-based models of radicalization is
a  widespread  phenomenon.  A  practical  and,  even
more, a political need for the use of risk assessment
tools (like VERA2R, TRAP-18 or others) is understand-
able. Yet, one of the most striking points of criticism
of such tools is that the factors and categories that
these tools are based on all lack substantial empirical
validation (Logvinov 2019, 79; RTI International 2018,
30; Knudsen 2018, 12; Desmarais et al. 2017, 180). This
fact creates a certain tension with the frequently di-
vergent objectives pursued by researchers, practition-
ers,  and  security  agencies.  The  argument  has  been
made that the development of risk assessment tools
and the definition of risk factors have become a mar-
ket  where  it  seems  to  be  more  important  to  sell  a
product than to focus on empirical validation (Logvi-
nov 2019, 39–47; Lloyd 2019, 8–11).
Such  “risk  factors”  become  especially  problematic
when they lead to high rates of false positives (or false
negatives) due to assessments being carried out with
a lack of topical expertise (Harris et al.  2015).  Addi-
tionally, numerous expert interviews confirm that cri-
teria such as “changes in behavior with regard to the
opposite sex” or a “deep preoccupation with life after
death  and/or  with  hell,”  (European  Foundation  for
Democracy 2017, 25) do not necessarily correlate with
a definitive tendency towards  radicalization (EXP01,
EXP02,  EXP03,  EXP04,  EXP08).  The  resulting  poten-
tially high error rates from the use of such criteria can
be more damaging than helpful as the young people
being  addressed  may  feel  subject  to  discrimination
and, if they are addressed directly may provide occa-
sion for their  peers  to exclude and stigmatize them
(Pettinger 2017, 37). The same is true for other social
contexts, such as the penal system.
Nonetheless, security agencies do utilize risk assess-
ment  tools  to  assess  the  risk  potential  for  society
posed by certain individuals. Deradicalization practi-
tioners, on the other hand, seek to assess their target
group(s) with regard to the risks they face and which
might warrant pedagogical or psychological interven-
tion, thus providing a starting point for potential de-
radicalization.  As  such,  the  focus  of  deradicalization
practitioners rests on the problems that the clients face
and  not  on  those  that  they  create.  Risk  assessment
tools  are  therefore,  in  general,  of  little  use  for  the
practical  work  of  deradicalization.  Assessments  of
“how radicalized” an individual is can only be helpful
as a very first starting point of a clearing process in
order  to determine the  context,  the  needs,  and the
kind of  steps  that  can  and should  subsequently  be
taken.
In the context of state (security) authorities assess-
ing the individual risks of acts of extremist violence,
we must keep in mind the individual nature of radi-
calization processes. Given the abundance of so-called
risk factors that can be identified, only a fraction of
potentially at-risk individuals actually radicalizes and
engages  in  extremism-related  behavior  (see  also
Bouhana 2019, 3ff.). Peter Neumann offers a building
blocks principle, where increased likelihood of radical-
ization requires a number of factors to be active. Even
so,  the  risk  of  radicalization  still  remains  nominal
(Neumann 2016).
Additionally, in the last five years governments and
civil  society  organizations  (CSOs)  have  published
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more and more “checklists” and handouts for “identi-
fying radicalization” with the intention of  providing
tools  for  use  in  the  field  (European Foundation  for
Democracy 2017; HM Government 2012; Ionescu et al.
2017). These publications are meant to serve as guide-
lines for actors such as teachers and prison officers. 
The availability  of  standardized  tools  for  (suppos-
edly) capturing individual attitudinal patterns and de-
velopment processes could lead security services and
policy-makers  to  regard  assessments  completed  by
practitioners  with  long-standing  professional  exper-
tise  to  be  superfluous.  In  addition,  the  use  of  such
tools is often accompanied by a shirking of responsi-
bilities as to the final assessment: A numeric output
generated  by  risk  assessment  tools  is  believed  by
some to provide a more reliable determination of the
“degree” of  risk than the individual  professional  as-
sessment offered by experienced practitioners. Oper-
ating under this assumption, there is a high risk that
the tool itself will ultimately be blamed for a (perhaps
misguided) decision, while the individual or affiliated
institution who applied the tool will be cleared of re-
sponsibility  for  whichever  conclusion  was  reached
(see Walkenhorst and Ruf 2018). 
After having offered first suggestions for a concep-
tualization of deradicalization and discussing three re-
curring topics in current debates around P/CVE and
deradicalisation  –  ideology,  identity,  and risk  –  the
following section shifts the focus towards the practi-
cal field by offering an overview of different fields of
action and structures of deradicalization work in Ger-
many that are essentially in line with our proposed
conceptualization of deradicalization.
4 Fields of Action and Structures of 
Deradicalization Work in Germany
Germany is a unique case, especially considering its
governing structures and the country’s particular his-
tory during the last century. To provide some clarifica-
tion: Germany is a federal republic with sixteen fed-
eral states, the  Länder (states). The Federal Republic
of  Germany  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  organizational
principle  of  subsidiarity.  Consequently,  the  federal
government has only a supporting role to play, if any
at all, in the design and implementation of many Län-
der policies. The level of Länder influence on even fun-
damental policies and, as a result, the immense differ-
ences between some German states are astonishing.
Even the most basic issues of public policy, such as
education  and academia,  but  also,  for  example,  the
penal system, and therefore many policies and work
fields  related  to  P/CVE  work,  lie  within  the  core
sphere  of  decision-making  of  the  Länder.  Conse-
quently,  prevention  policies  across  Germany  are
largely driven by the respective political setting in the
state and differ, at times, substantially.
Due to the country’s history, all matters related to
restricting freedom of speech and expression in gen-
eral,  but  particularly  in  combination  with  the  fight
against supposedly dangerous or extremist ideologies,
are highly sensitive. In the post–World War II era, and
subsequently in reunified Germany, state actors did
not want to be seen as engaged in ideologically driven
work. As a result, many aspects of what is now com-
monly known as P/CVE work have traditionally been
designed and implemented by CSOs.
This forms part of the reason why, in the debate sur-
rounding actors and fields of action for deradicaliza-
tion, Germany is often viewed as an exceptional case
due to the relatively dominant role taken by civil soci-
ety organizations in P/CVE work, when compared to
other countries in Europe or around the globe. How-
ever, even if German civil society has certainly histori-
cally assumed a prominent position, it would be false
to assume that civil society was the most influential
actor today.
4.1 Roles and Relations between State and Civil 
Society
Due to the diversity  of  the statewide,  regional,  and
communal  measures  distributed  across  the  German
federal structures, arriving at any definitive, general-
ized assessment of  how the  respective  relations  be-
tween  state(s)  and  civil  society  are  shaped  is  ex-
tremely difficult. Even though civil society actors are
far from being the only players in the field (Gruber
and Lützinger 2017a, 7), comparisons with France or
the  United  Kingdom show  that  Germany’s  “softer”
and more varied approach, including a large share of
civil society responsibility, is particularly noteworthy
(Foley 2013, 316; République Française, Premier Min-
istre 2016). Despite the fact that the current situation
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and the diversity of approaches in Germany certainly
include many aspects worthy of criticism,2 they may,
at the same time, open up many opportunities, espe-
cially with regard to Islamist extremism. The diverse
German P/CVE structure including its large share of
civil society involvement allows for more flexible and
less  security-oriented  solutions  on  the  ground.  The
mistakes and failed approaches, as well as the cases of
observed  (and,  unfortunately,  limited)  successes3
achieved by  other  nations  –  which  have  been con-
fronted with Islamist extremism much longer and to a
greater degree (Crowell 2017) – can serve as lessons
for Germany, which is newer to the phenomenon of
Islamist extremism, with its  particular federal struc-
ture. This is especially relevant to the issue of respect-
ful  (multi-agency)  cooperation  among  all  actors  on
equal terms (see Walkenhorst and Ruf 2018).
Insights gained from the frequently cited negative
example of France (and elsewhere) stand in opposition
to demands currently being voiced in some public de-
bates in Germany, but also the wider EU, that call for
a “strong” state to apply stricter security measures in
response to growing extremist threats. In France, the
state of emergency that was declared (and repeatedly
extended) following the terror attacks in Paris on No-
vember 13, 2015, ultimately led to the adoption of a
new anti-terror law. This law, which now includes nu-
merous mechanisms of  the state of emergency, is  a
prime example of  the  problematic  results  when the
debate surrounding P/CVE policies is increasingly ap-
propriated  by  the  realm  of  mere  security  policy
(United Nations News Centre 2017). A seeming confir-
mation of extremist narratives by an anti-liberal, secu-
rity-policy-focused and, at worst, discriminatory over-
reaction of the state, and the resultant undermining
of its own supposed moral superiority, may endanger
the stated goal of effective P/CVE work.
In Germany, neither a purely state-centered nor a
purely  civil  society–focused  approach  has  prevailed
2 Including the delayed response to the development of ex-
tremist currents in Germany that were influenced by inter-
national politics instead of pursuing a forceful and concen-
trated approach in the form of a comprehensive strategy 
pursued by the government.
3 Such as the prominent Danish Aarhus model, which 
demonstrates how eff ective cooperation among numerous 
state and non-state actors can function with mutually bene-
ficial results (see Agerschou 2014).
fully, due to the country’s complex federal (funding)
structure. Germany is, and remains for the moment, a
hybrid model with varying areas of focus and success
rates dependent on the respective federal state – even
if a tendency towards increased securitization of this
policy area has been coming to the fore.  This coin-
cides with the perception of CSOs being pushed out
of the P/CVE work field in favor of an increased focus
on  security  (EXP01,  EXP02,  EXP03,  EXP04,  EXP06,
EXP08, EXP10, EXP12).
4.2 Working Areas and Settings
Based on our interviews with practitioners as well as
existing surveys and our own conceptualization of the
term deradicalization,  we differentiate between four
categories  of  deradicalization  work  in  Germany,  on
which we will subsequently provide further detail and
analysis.4 At the outset, we should mention that there
are currently no notable examples of P/CVE work tar-
geting  the  area  of  far-left  extremism  in  Germany,
apart from the exit program run by the German Fed-
eral  Office  for  the  Protection  of  the  Constitution
(BfV),  Germany’s  federal  domestic  intelligence  ser-
vice.  This  program,  which  focuses  only  on  violent
forms of far-left extremism, is still in place but is not
very successful due to insufficient demand and an in-
adequate design (Deutscher Bundestag 2017, 2–3).
4.2.1 Social Environment Support
Specific support cases
Within the public debate, counseling options for pre-
vention work are often discussed as family support or
counselling (for example RAN Collection 2019). In re-
ality, the group who make use of counseling extends
far beyond the family members of supposedly radical-
ized individuals or those at risk of radicalizing (EXP01,
EXP02, EXP03, EXP04, EXP06, EXP08, EXP10, EXP12).
In Germany, turning to such options for support has
now become an established practice for  many com-
munities, especially in schools and youth work insti-
tutions.  This  widespread  acknowledgement  and  ac-
ceptance of the approach is likely due to the fact that
4 Due to the diff erent functional logic of far-left  extremism 
(compared to far-right or Islamist extremism) and the lim-
ited off ers of prevention and deradicalization work, we do 
not address this issue any further within our article (see Te-
une 2018).
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from 2012 onwards, the Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees (BAMF) has dedicated an entire Advice
Centre on Radicalisation to this task (Beratungsstelle
“Radikalisierung” 2018, 3). The Advice Centre offers a
first  consultation  by  telephone  and subsequently,  if
deemed necessary, refers those seeking help to one of
the thirteen regional advice centers, run by eight dif-
ferent CSOs and two government authorities. BAMF,
like the interviewed experts, now refers to the target
groups of their and their partners’ advice services as
“relatives, friends, reference persons from school, in-
stitutions of child- and youth-care, social assistance,
leisure  organizations,  etc.”  (Beratungsstelle  “Radi-
kalisierung” 2018, 3). The center and its network are
only active in connection with Islamist extremism. For
the area of far-right extremism, the services provided
by the Mobile Counseling Teams have been well es-
tablished for years. Since 2015, many of these regional
organizations have joined together in the form of a
national association (Bundesverband Mobile Beratung
e.V., n.d.). In line with this, it makes sense to replace
the term “family support” with the broader, and more
accurate, term of “social environment support”. 
Theoretically,  social  environment  support  can  be
placed  in  the  category  of  systemic  counseling  and
differs from outreach work on account of its indirect
interactions with radicalized individuals or those who
are (potentially) at risk of radicalization via their so-
cial environment (El-Mafaalani et al. 2016, 17). Its ulti-
mate objective is deradicalization and/or eliminating
the threat of (further) radicalization (El-Mafaalani et
al. 2016, 17). As illustrated by expert interviews with
practitioners working in Germany and other EU mem-
ber states, as well as by the publicly accessible activity
descriptions  provided by prominent actors,5 support
work is  in reality often far more diverse than mere
counseling  (EXP01,  EXP02,  EXP03,  EXP04,  EXP05,
EXP06, EXP07, EXP08, EXP09, EXP10, EXP11). Current
deradicalization practices cannot easily be subdivided
into the categories of systemic and outreach counsel-
ing.  Instead,  support  work  involves  advice  centers
that, depending on the individual needs of those seek-
ing help, conduct their activities based on the specific
case  at  hand;  this  may  include  social  environment
5 Such as Legato (Hamburg), HAYAT (Berlin), or Violence 
Prevention Network (Berlin, Hesse, Bavaria).
support  but may easily comprise outreach work for
potentially radicalized individuals as well.
Awareness-raising  and  empowering  the  social
environment
A second – and essential – task performed in the con-
text  of  social  environment  support  involves  educa-
tional, awareness raising, and empowerment work fo-
cusing on the private and professional environments
within which individuals at risk of radicalization find
themselves. The mobile counseling teams also play a
prominent role in this work for the area of far-right
extremism.
The experiences of counselors and other practition-
ers  working  in the  area of  Islamist  extremism have
shown that there is a tendency towards overreaction
on the part of people who have professional contact
with  young  people  (EXP01,  EXP03,  EXP10).  Many
young religious Muslims, or those curious and learn-
ing about the religion, find themselves in serious situ-
ations  of  confrontation  with  their  teachers  and/or
school administrators. According to practitioners, ed-
ucators often appear to be unprepared to comprehend
and/or deal with the real lives of young people with
diverse cultural backgrounds (EXP01, EXP03, EXP10).
In  many European countries,  societal  insecurities  in
the  face  of  public  expressions  of  Islamic  religious
practices  have  proliferated  even  among  educational
professionals  in  schools.  Counseling  centers  can  be
helpful in this context: they can classify and contextu-
alize  statements  and  behaviors,  give  the  “all  clear”
when needed, or,  if  and where necessary, take on a
proactive deradicalizing role without directly address-
ing and potentially scaring and stigmatizing the po-
tentially  radicalized  target  group.  Counselors  have
also found disseminator or train-the-trainer programs
useful  for  individuals who have regular professional
contact  with  children  and  young  people  (EXP01,
EXP03). Interestingly, there seem to be fewer reports
about social  overreactions  with regard to far-left or
far-right extremism. In these two contexts in particu-
lar, statements and/or actions that appear to be ex-
tremist in nature often appear to be dismissed or tol-
erated as expressions of “adolescent rebellion” – a di-
mension that is often not “granted” when it comes to
Muslim youth (EXP03,  EXP06,  EXP08).  When young
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people turn towards the ideological offerings provided
by right or left-wing extremist spectra, they seem to
enjoy a greater degree of tolerance within German so-
ciety than those who turn to the relatively new phe-
nomenon of Islamist extremism.
4.2.2 Counseling and Support for Those at Risk of 
Radicalization and (Partially) Radicalized 
Individuals
The  work  of  social  environment  support  described
above can serve as a precursor for direct work with
those at risk of radicalization. Awareness-raising mea-
sures  executed  in  the  framework  of  social  environ-
ment support, such as targeting educators, is one pos-
sibility  for  establishing  direct  contact  between  the
counseling offices and young people who may be at
risk of radicalizing. This does of course depend on the
willingness of the affected individuals to enter into di-
alog and to participate – as is the case for most ap-
proaches  to  prevention  and deradicalization.  In  this
sense, the disseminators include not only teachers at
schools,  but  also  facilities  and  institutions  such  as
child and family  advice and counseling centers,  the
police, etc. (Hohnstein, Greuel, and Glaser 2015, 25).
These  “multiplier-mediated”  counseling  sessions  are
firmly established within prevention and deradicaliza-
tion work for both far-right extremism and Islamist
extremism. Within both areas, the work suffers from a
lack  of  coordination,  sustainability,  and  human  re-
sources for providing these services, which are limited
in duration and financed almost exclusively by fixed-
term project  funding (EXP01,  EXP02,  EXP03,  EXP04,
EXP05, EXP08, EXP10; Hohnstein, Greuel, and Glaser
2015, 25).
The street work programs originating from the late
1980s  offer  another  option  for  initiating  outreach
work (Hohnstein,  Greuel,  and Glaser 2015,  22).  This
approach, which stems from work with hard-to-reach
target groups who often fall outside of regular social
work  structures  (such  as  hooligans,  prostitutes,  ad-
dicts), was adapted and has been used in the area of
far-right extremism in Germany for years. It is classi-
cally oriented on the principles of acceptance-based
youth work and makes use of socio-pedagogical ap-
proaches to prevent individuals from slipping (further)
into extremist social circles. However, street work pro-
grams specifically tailored to extremism have continu-
ously diminished in importance and are all but extinct
today (EXP12). Services targeting far-right extremism
have diminished in numbers as well, which, according
to Hohnstein, Greuel, and Glaser (2015, 57), is in large
part due to a decline in the visibility of classic cliques
within the non-virtual, public realm.  
The same rule generally applies to both street work
projects and individual counseling: The design of any
promising programs must be based on the individual
personality  structures  and  needs  of  the  individual.
Counseling processes can never be fully standardized
(EXP01, EXP02, EXP03, EXP04, EXP05, EXP06, EXP07,
EXP08, EXP09, EXP10, EXP11). Accepting this reality is
an essential prerequisite for initiating voluntary con-
tact with the respective individuals and ensuring that
outcomes  persist.  The  experiences  of  actors  in  this
field show that the personal  and professional  back-
grounds of the counselors may play a significant role.
Different experiences and varied approaches to P/CVE
work can therefore be seen as opportunities and not
necessarily as signs of deficient standards or quality
control.
Including formers in P/CVE and deradicalization
work
Involving former extremists in P/CVE work follow-
ing a successful process of deradicalization and social
reintegration remains a contested strategy across in-
ternational debates (Global Center on Cooperative Se-
curity and International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
– The Hague 2017, 27; Hohnstein, Greuel, and Glaser
2015, 53–54). We also witnessed a degree of disagree-
ment on this subject among experts working as prac-
titioners  (EXP02,  EXP03,  EXP04,  EXP05,  EXP06,
EXP08). The experts we interviewed in the area of Is-
lamist extremism tended to consider the deployment
of former extremists as rather insignificant. This find-
ing comes as no surprise in light of the fact that we
have not to date observed many cases of former Is-
lamists actually deployed in such a practical capacity
beyond media campaigns. Even in the area of far-right
extremism  –  with  the  highest  portion  of  formers,
some of  whom actually  (co-)founded  exit  programs
themselves  (EXIT-Deutschland,  n.d.;  EXIT Fryshuset,
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n.d.) – their involvement tends to be met with accep-
tance rather than endorsement (EXP04, EXP05).
The issue of whether formers are professionally and
pedagogically  suited  to perform such work is  often
neglected. All counseling staff working in the area of
prevention and deradicalization should be required to
possess  the  necessary  skills  and  experience  (RAN
2017a, 5). Personal first-hand experience of extremism
alone is simply not a sufficient qualification. As such,
besides questions of ethical acceptability and willing-
ness on the part of the formers-turned-P/CVE-practi-
tioners, we must also take their professional suitabil-
ity into consideration.
In sum, we may conclude that the range of services
on offer – including in the area of exit counseling and
support – has developed organically rather than hav-
ing been designed through the support of academic
research  and advice.  Analogous  to  research  on  this
subject, practical work draws largely from earlier pro-
fessional  experience  in  other  areas  of  youth  social
work, such as youth work with right wing extremists
in the 1980s and 1990s (Hohnstein, Greuel and Glaser
2015, 22–23). Those reinterpreted approaches for the
context of exit  support for far-right extremists were
eventually transferred and adapted to the area of Is-
lamist extremism (EXP12). This is underlined by the
fact that organizations originally concerned with far-
right  extremists  later  also  began  working  with  Is-
lamist  extremists  (for  example  Violence  Prevention
Network e.V.,  see Handle,  Korn,  and Mücke 2019 or
ZDK Gesellschaft Demokratische Kultur gGmbH, see
Hayat-Deutschland Beratungsstelle Deradikalisierung
n.d.). This is why the underlying practice of deradical-
ization  work  proves  to  exhibit  only  nuanced differ-
ences between the areas of far-right extremism and
Islamist  extremism.  There  are  also  close  similarities
with work with religious sects, cults, gangs etc. (such
as the area-specific cultural, religious, and ideological
knowledge held by the practitioners).
4.2.4 Deradicalization in the Penal System
The practice of deradicalization work in penal institu-
tions is faced with a particular challenge: On the one
hand, prisons are often considered “breeding grounds”
for radicalization, as inmates are particularly vulnera-
ble due to extraordinary high levels of stress and their
(physical  as  well  as  psychological)  separation  from
their  social  environment  (Silke  and  Veldhuis  2017).
Fellow  inmates  and  recruiters  are  able  to  leverage
these vulnerabilities in order to radicalize and/or re-
cruit other inmates. On the other hand, prisons also
house  radicalized  individuals,  who  may  undergo  a
positive process of cognitive and/or emotional open-
ing on account of the state of vulnerability in which
they find themselves and might be more likely to be
interested in or convinced to participate in disengage-
ment  or  deradicalization  programs  (Neumann  2017,
42).6
As the design and implementation of deradicaliza-
tion measures  in  the penal  system is  dependent on
the respective country’s approach to justice and the
characteristics of its penal system as well as the con-
figuration of its P/CVE strategies, presenting a com-
prehensive overview and analysis of such measures is
beyond the scope of this article. This holds true even
for our case study of Germany alone. To date, contri-
butions dedicated to providing an overview of the P/
CVE landscape in Germany have tended to work on
systemizing projects and actors rather than aiming at
understanding specific measures or approaches. Cur-
rently, the project MAPEX (“Mapping and Analysis of
Prevention and Deradicalization Projects dealing with
Islamist  Radicalization”;  12/2017  to  11/2020)  is  the
only wider effort aiming at delivering both a compre-
hensive overview and analysis of the German P/CVE
landscape dealing with Islamist extremism. This sheds
light  on  one  of  the  central  issues  confronting  this
field: a lack of empirical analysis of the topic across all
phenomena.
The  most  complete  investigations  into  extremism
and P/CVE within the German penal  system at the
time  of  writing  were  published  by  the Centre  for
Criminology  in  2017.  Intervention  services  offered
within  the  penal  system may  comprise  educational
possibilities, career advice and vocational training op-
portunities,  belief-based  intervention,  psychological
and cognitive intervention, creative and cultural activ-
ities, sports, and the involvement of families, mentors
and “listeners” (Illgner et al. 2017, 45–48). The aim of
these interventions is to strengthen processes of de-
6 For a current overview of the international research de-
bate, see Silke and Veldhuis 2017 as well as Council of Eu-
rope 2016.
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radicalization and distancing. Particularly in the scope
of belief-based intervention, such measures are sub-
ject to the tension between religious freedom and se-
curity considerations (Illgner et al. 2017, 99).
Measures in the context of the penal system can be
further  differentiated based on the target  group.  In
this context, work is either carried out directly with
radicalized  inmates,  those  at  risk  of  radicalization,
their social environment, or prison staff and other pe-
nal system personnel (for example awareness-raising
and disseminator trainings). 
5 Conclusion
This article’s aim was to discuss the concept of derad-
icalization in relation to existing debates and system-
atizations of prevention work, using these insights to
synthesize a first suggestion for a more coherent con-
ceptualization of deradicalization.
To ensure practical relevance, a systematic analysis
of the existing broader German P/CVE landscape was
conducted,  combining a review of existing literature
with insights from exploratory interviews with practi-
tioners.  This  led  to  the  subsequent  exclusion  of  all
work fields that do not match the proposed definition
of deradicalization. Four fields of work were classified
as being directly linked to deradicalization processes:
social  environment  support,  counseling  and support
for those at risk of radicalization and (partially) radi-
calized individuals, exit support and stabilization, and
deradicalization in prisons. These fields were then de-
scribed in more detail in order to provide a focused
overview of the practical field of deradicalization in
Germany.
Through this process a number of challenges were
identified, which should be taken into account when
discussing, designing, and/or implementing deradical-
ization:
Firstly,  practitioners,  researchers,  (security)  agency
staff, and policy-makers remain in disagreement as to
the definition and the understanding of deradicaliza-
tion. This has led to rather inconsistent and even con-
tradictory approaches being deployed at various soci-
etal, governmental, and regional levels. Literature dis-
cussing deradicalization often seems to fail to provide
a satisfying mode of transfer for practical application
in the field. This is partly due to the predominant divi-
sion between theory and practice or, respectively, be-
tween those who  do research and those  who are ob-
jects of research. 
Secondly,  most  of  the  literature,  as  well  as  inter-
viewed experts from the field, show agreement on at
least  one  matter:  Processes  of  radicalization  always
develop individually and are heavily dependent on the
respective biography and societal context of the per-
son in question. As such, some of the most effective
means  to  overcome  the  dichotomous  thinking  pat-
terns and worldviews held by radicalized individuals
include  measures  aimed  at  promoting  tolerance  of
ambiguity,  while  also  strengthening  personal  re-
silience and creating positive experiences of self-effi-
cacy. In most cases, long-term and sustainable deradi-
calization only proves successful when established on
this basis. 
Thirdly,  experiences  of  social  environment support
show that further professional training and awareness
raising for staff members of institutions like kinder-
gartens, schools, youth welfare, penal establishments,
probationary services, etc. can help to promote confi-
dence when dealing with processes of radicalization
and with individuals potentially at risk of radicalizing.
Accordingly, capacities in terms of time and financing
should be provided for professional training courses
that are adapted to current developments and target
the staff members who perform educational work in
this area (socio-pedagogical, psychological, etc.). 
Finally, the existing hybrid model of shared respon-
sibility between CSOs and state actors has led to the
formation  of  a  diverse  and regionally  differentiated
landscape of deradicalization work in Germany. While
problem areas such as dysfunctional multi-agency co-
operation (often caused by an increasing focus on se-
curitization and resulting conflicts  between security
and civil actors) undoubtedly continue to exist, the di-
versity of projects, approaches, and professional disci-
plines within the four fields of action promises to ac-
count for the complexity of radicalization and deradi-
calization  more  adequately  than  any  centralized,
“one-size-fits-all” solution. 
However, in order to develop its full potential, con-
sistent  and  collaborative  exchanges  between  all  in-
volved actors must be improved. In light of the vari-
ous  opportunities  for  benefiting  from knowledge of
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others, as well as the fact that various actors are ac-
tive  within  the  same  systems  (for  example,  youth
work, schools, prisons), it seems crucial to ensure that
conditions  are  in  place  for  systematic  exchange  on
points of access to the target groups, methods, obsta-
cles, and success factors. The fact that such conditions
have  not  been  created  by  now is  surprising,  if  not
troubling, in light of the seriousness of the issue. 
Primary sources
EXP01: Experienced P/CVE practitioner and case man-
ager (social environment support, counselling for 
at-risk and partially radicalized individuals, and 
exit work) in the area of Islamist extremism, and 
social scientist. Interview with Maximilian Ruf, 
Berlin, Oct. 6, 2017.
EXP02: Experienced P/CVE practitioner and case man-
ager (counselling for at-risk and partially radical-
ized individuals, exit work, and multiplier trainings 
in- and outside of prisons) in the area of right-wing
extremism. Interview with Till Baaken, Berlin, Oct. 
13, 2017.
EXP03: Experienced P/CVE practitioner and case man-
ager (social environment support, counselling for 
at-risk and partially radicalized individuals, and 
exit work) in the area of Islamist extremism. Inter-
view with Maximilian Ruf, Berlin, Oct. 18, 2017.
EXP04: Experienced P/CVE practitioner (exit work and
multiplier trainings in- and outside of prisons) in 
the area of right-wing extremism. Interview with 
Maximilian Ruf, Berlin, Oct. 20, 2017.
EXP05: Founder and manager of P/CVE initiatives, ex-
perienced practitioner and case manager (coun-
selling for at-risk and partially radicalized individu-
als, exit work) in the area of right-wing extremism. 
Interview with Maximilian Ruf, Berlin, Oct.26, 2017.
EXP06: P/CVE project coordinator and experienced 
practitioner (counselling for at-risk and partially 
radicalized individuals and exit work) in the area of
Islamist extremism. Interview with Till Baaken, 
Berlin, Oct. 27, 2017.
EXP07: P/CVE project coordinator and experienced 
practitioner (primary prevention, social environ-
ment support, counselling for at-risk and partially 
radicalized individuals, exit work in-and outside of 
prison) in the areas of Islamist and right-wing ex-
tremism. Interview with Till Baaken, Berlin, Nov. 
21, 2017.
EXP08: P/CVE project coordinator and experienced 
practitioner (social environment support, coun-
selling for at-risk and partially radicalized individu-
als, exit work in- and outside of prison) in the area 
of Islamist extremism. Interview with Maximilian 
Ruf, Berlin, Nov. 22, 2017.
EXP09: P/CVE project coordinator and experienced 
practitioner (counselling for at-risk and partially 
radicalized individuals, exit work) in the area of 
right-wing extremism. Interview with Till Baaken, 
Berlin, Nov. 22, 2017.
EXP10: Experienced P/CVE practitioner (social envir-
onment support, counselling for at-risk and par-
tially radicalized individuals, exit work in- and out-
side of prison) in the area of Islamist extremism. In-
terview with Maximilian Ruf, Berlin, Nov. 24, 2017.
EXP11: Experienced P/CVE practitioner (social envir-
onment support, counselling for at-risk and par-
tially radicalized individuals) in the area of Islamist
extremism, and psychologist. Interview with Till 
Baaken, Berlin, Dec. 4, 2017.
EXP12: Founder and manager of non-governmental 
organizations working on P/CVE issues and experi-
enced practitioner (social environment support, 
counselling for at-risk and partially radicalized in-
dividuals, exit work in- and outside of prison) in 
the areas of Islamist and right-wing extremism. In-
terview with Dennis Walkenhorst, Berlin, Apr. 18, 
2018.
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